1. Introduction. – 2. Methodology. – 3. Sources Review. – 4. The Extent of Government Liability for Nuclear Damage. – 4.1. In Support of Government Intervention to Compensate for Nuclear Damage. – 4.2. Opposition to Government Intervention in Nuclear Damage Compensation. – 4.3. Illustrative Examples from Legal Practice on Compensation for Nuclear Damage. – 5. Cases Of Direct Government Intervention to Compensate for Nuclear Damage. – 5.1. Government Intervention Where Operator-Based Compensation Is Insufficient. – 5.2. Government Intervention Where Operator Liability Is Excluded or Fully Exhausted. – 6. Compensation Funds and Operator Pool Mechanisms in Comparative Perspective. – 7. Conclusions.
Background: International nuclear liability conventions, particularly the Paris Convention of 1960 and the Vienna Convention of 1963, as amended in 1997, establish the principle of exclusive operator liability, under which the licensed nuclear operator bears sole responsibility for compensating for damage resulting from a nuclear incident. In practice, however, this principle encounters significant limitations in situations where operator liability cannot be effectively enforced, such as insolvency, armed conflict, force majeure, or insufficient financial guarantees. These exceptional circumstances raise questions regarding the role of the state in ensuring adequate compensation for victims of nuclear damage.
Methods: The study employs a combination of doctrinal, analytical, comparative, descriptive, and statistical research methods. International nuclear liability treaties are examined alongside national legislation, particularly Ukrainian Law No. 2893 of 2001 and Saudi Law No. M/81 of 2018. The comparative method is used to assess how each legal system addresses exceptional state intervention and compensation mechanisms, while descriptive and statistical analyses draw on international practice and comparative data on operator liability limits and financial security arrangements.
Results and Conclusions: The analysis demonstrates that both Ukraine and Saudi Arabia recognise the possibility of state intervention when operator-based compensation proves inadequate. However, Ukraine provides a more explicit and structured statutory framework for governmental liability and supplementary compensation mechanisms, whereas Saudi Arabia adopts a more conditional and subsidiary approach. The study concludes that clearer institutional arrangements and designated state compensation mechanisms are necessary, particularly in Saudi Arabia, to enhance alignment with international standards and ensure effective protection of victims of nuclear incidents.