Autonomous Weapon Systems: Attributing the Corporate Accountability
Summary: : 1. Introduction. – 2. Lack of Mechanisms: Respecting the Principles of International Law. – 3. Alternative International Complaint Mechanisms to Corporate Actors. – 4. Conclusions.
Methods: This paper indicates that the most important problem arising from the use of AWS is the attribution responsibility for the violation of corporate actors. Nevertheless, it is ambiguous who is legally responsible for these international crimes, thus creating an accountability gap. The main problem regarding corporate responsibility that covers the process of employing AWS is determining who exercises causal control over a chain of acts leading to the crime’s commission. The paper proposes a more optimistic view of artificial intelligence, raising two challenges for corporate responsibility. First, the paper maps the framework of the use of AWS regarding corporate actors. Second, the article identifies the problem of accountability by presenting some possible scenarios linked to the AWS context as a solution to this problem.
Results and Conclusions: The results have exposed ambiguity in international law and the absence of essential laws regarding the attribution of responsibility for AWS and the punishment of the perpetrator – international law needs to be improved and regulated.
Abstract
Background: The use of autonomous weapon systems (AWS) in armed conflict has been rapidly expanding. Consequently, the development of AWS worries legal scholars. If AWS were to operate without ‘meaningful human control’, the violation of international law and human rights would be unpreventable.
Methods: This paper indicates that the most important problem arising from the use of AWS is the attribution responsibility for the violation of corporate actors. Nevertheless, it is ambiguous who is legally responsible for these international crimes, thus creating an accountability gap. The main problem regarding corporate responsibility that covers the process of employing AWS is determining who exercises causal control over a chain of acts leading to the crime’s commission. The paper proposes a more optimistic view of artificial intelligence, raising two challenges for corporate responsibility. First, the paper maps the framework of the use of AWS regarding corporate actors. Second, the article identifies the problem of accountability by presenting some possible scenarios linked to the AWS context as a solution to this problem.
Results and Conclusions: The results have exposed ambiguity in international law and the absence of essential laws regarding the attribution of responsibility for AWS and the punishment of the perpetrator – international law needs to be improved and regulated.
About Authors
Jinane El Baroudy
PhD in Law, Assistant professor, public department, Prince Sultan University, KSA, jbaroudy@psu.edu.sa
Corresponding author, solely responsible for writing, research, and analysis of sources.
Competing interests: The author declares no competing interests.
Disclaimer: The author declares that her opinion and views expressed in this manuscript are free of any impact of any organizations.
Translation: The content of this article was translated with the participation of third parties under the authors’ supervision.
Managing editor – Mag Polina Siedova. English Editor – Dr. Sarah White.
Guest Editors of the Special Issue: Dr Mohammed Albakjaji, Prince Sultan University, and Dr Maya Khater, Al Yamamah University, Saudi Arabia.
Managing editor – Dr. Yuliia Baklazhenko. English Editor – Dr. Sarah White.
Copyright: © 2023 Jinane El Baroudy, This is an open access article distributed under the terms of the Creative Commons Attribution License, (CC BY 4.0), which permits unrestricted use, distribution, and reproduction in any medium, provided the original author and source are credited.
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Джінане Ель Баруді
АНОТАЦІЯ
Передумови. Використання автономних систем озброєння (AСО) у збройних
конфліктах стрімко розширюється. Отже, розвиток АСО хвилює
правознавців. Якби AСО працювала без «суттєвого контролю з боку
людини», було б неможливо запобігти порушенням міжнародного права та
прав людини. У кількох аспектах людського існування нещодавно почав
домінувати штучний інтелект (ШІ). Потужність штучного інтелекту,
безсумнівно, зростає разом із технологіями та спонукає переосмислити
майбутнє. Те, що раніше вважалося концепцією науково-фантастичного
фільму, тепер стало реальністю зі створенням автономних систем озброєння.
Методи. У цій статті показано, що найважливішою проблемою, яка виникає
внаслідок використання AСО, є встановлення відповідальності за порушення
з боку корпоративних суб’єктів. І все ж неясно, хто несе юридичну
відповідальність за ці міжнародні злочини, що створює прогалину у
підзвітності. Основним питанням щодо корпоративної відповідальності, яка
охоплює процес застосування АСО, є визначення того, хто здійснює
причинно-наслідковий контроль за ланцюжком дій, що призводять до
вчинення злочину. У роботі запропоновано більш оптимістичний погляд на
штучний інтелект, що піднімає дві проблеми для корпоративної
відповідальності. По-перше, окреслено рамки використання АСО щодо
корпоративних суб’єктів. По-друге, стаття визначає проблему підзвітності,
пропонуючи деякі можливі сценарії, пов’язані з контекстом АСО, як
вирішення цієї проблеми.
Результати та висновки. Результати виявили неоднозначність у
міжнародному праві та відсутність відповідних законів щодо визначення
відповідальності за використання АСО та покарання винного — міжнародне
право потребує вдосконалення та регулювання. Хоча немає згоди щодо того,
чи законно надавати автономним роботам можливість убивати невинних
цивільних осіб, слід пам’ятати, що держави повинні мати свою точку зору,
коли ухвалюють рішення, що відповідають велінням громадської свідомості
та принципам гуманності, представленим в Декларації Мартенса та
Міжнародному гуманітарному праві.
Publication history
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Submitted on 11 Apr 2023 / Revised 1st 29 Apr 2023 / Revised 2nd 05 May 2023 / Approved 22 May 2023 / Published: 17 Jun 2023
How to cite it?
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Jinane El Baroudy, ‘Autonomous Weapon Systems: Attributing the Corporate Accountability’ 2023 Special Issue Access to Justice in Eastern Europe 222-234. https://doi.org/10.33327/AJEE-18- 6S013
